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Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform:
Avoidance, Error and Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages (2002)
Neil Vidmar
Duke Law School

“The present empirical studies of all stages of the punitive damages decision show that the major
locus of unreliability and disorder in punitive damages decisions is in jurors’ assessments of an
appropriate dollar award.”
Sunstein et al., Punitive Damages: How Jurors Decide (2002)

“When you come to a word or sentence you do not understand, or that is unfamiliar to you, it is not
permissible to just say ‘grasshopper’ and jump over it. You are in danger of losing the meaning of
what you are reading.”
Elementary school teacher, Maple Street School, Gillespie, Illinois, circa 1950

I. Introduction
This article addresses tort reform claims made in Cass R. Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John W.
Payne, David A. Schkade and W. Kip Viscusi in Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide1 and related
articles, research that was largely underwritten by the Exxon Corporation. 2 Based upon a series of
simulation experiments, those authors have made a general claim that jur ies are incapable of making
coherent judgments about punitive damages. In this article I raise serious methodological problems

1

Cass Sunstein et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002) (hereinafter “Punitive Damages”).
See Amon, Exxon Bankrolls Critics of Punitives, Then It Cites the Research in Appeal of $5.3 Billion Valdez Award,
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 17, 1999; Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit the Need; In the 1990s , Exxon
Began Paying for Research into Juries and the Damages They award . The Findings Have Served the Firm Well in
Court, LOS A NGELES TIMES, December 3, 2003; William R. Freudenburg, The Intersection of Corporate Cash ,
Science and the Law: Toward a Closer Examination, Paper Abstract , Session on Law and Society: Legal Institutions
and Processes, Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, August 16, 2003. I raise here, in truth not
very subtly, the role of Exxon in funding the studies. However, I leave for another day, and perhaps for other writers,
the issue of the role of Exxon in vetting which studies would be funded and which not, the use of the studies in
Exxon’s own litigation, the fact that most of the experiments, albeit not all, were published in student-edited law
reviews rather than in peer-reviewed social science journals, and other matters. These issues deserve more extensive
treatment, see, e.g. see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 867, 868-71, including note 16 (1999). However, in the remainder
of this article I limit myself to addressing on their own merits the research experiments and the authors’ conclusions
from those experiments.
2
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bearing on the validity of the research, and, therefore, its ability to provide judges and legislators
with useful information about juries and punitive damages.
The principal conclusion about juries is stated in the concluding chapter of Punitive
Damages:
The many systematic patterns of behavior that we observed are convincing
evidence of the jurors’ conscientiousness. Nonethe less, the legally
required decision tasks often seemed to exceed their individual and social
capacities. The decision task is not well defined by jury instructions; jurors
are not provided with the necessary background information or
experiences to make reliable judgments; and inherent cognitive limitations
interfered with their performance of the specific judgments prescribed by
our punitive damages system. Jurors’ good intentions and high levels of
motivation were thwarted by the inherent complexity of the legal decision
task and by the lack of clear instructions or other effective guidance. The
result is a decision process that is unreliable, erratic and unpredictable. 3
Based on the above conclusions, the book makes a policy recommendation that would
remove punitive damages decisions entirely from the jury: “…serious consideration should be given
to moving away from the jury and toward a system of civil fines, perhaps through a damages
schedule of the sort that has been used in many areas of the law, including workers’ compensation
and environmental violations.”4
These claims take place at a time and context in which the Supreme Court and lower courts
have struggled with developing legal doctrine to address outlier awards involving punitive damages. 5
Simultaneously, state and federal legislators are considering reforms to the American tort system that
also involve punitive damages. The authors of Punitive Damages are all eminent scholars in their
fields and, combined with the problem of outlier awards, their conclusions have gained the attention
of courts and policy makers. Punitive Damages and articles upon which the book draws have been
cited by the Exxon Corporation in its own litigation6 and in amicus briefs before the Supreme

3

PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 241. To be fair, in the final two paragraphs of the book Cass Sunstein cautiously states that
“[o]ur findings do not point directly to social reforms, but in the next paragraph they further conclude that, “[i]f our
findings are correct, perhaps the ideal system of punitive damages would not involve juries or even judges, but
specialists in the subject matter at hand, who would be able to create clear guidelines for punitive awards,” at 258.
4
PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 242; see also 257.
5
E.g. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell , 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Industries, Inc
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996);
6
In Re The Exxon Corp. et al., U.S. Ct. App., 9th Cir. No. 97-35191 (1997); American Tort Reform Association,
Amicus Brief in Support of Appellants Exxon Corporation et.al, in In Re The Exxon Corp. et al., U.S. Ct. App., 9th Cir.
No. 97-35191 (1997).
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Court. 7 Punitive Damages or the original articles upon which it is based, have been cited in dictum
by the Supreme Court. 8 Some lower courts have recently treated the book as social science authority.
In In re Simon II Litigation, for example, Judge Weinstein stated:
…in a pathbreaking empirical multidisciplinary study, How Juries Decide,
the authors demonstrated that, while jurors can agree on the degree of moral
and ethical features of defendants who cause massive harm, conscientious as
they are, they have no criteria or standards enabling them to translate their
findings into dollar amounts….Based on this research we can expect
relatively uniform assessments of compensatory damages in tobacco cases,
but widely variant damages that will be appreciably higher when awarded
by local juries than by juries in a national class action… 9
In TVT Records v. Island Jam Music one of the articles that forms a part of Punitive Damages is
quoted as authority. 10
Critiques of individual articles in the Exxon body of research have appeared in the
academic literature. 11 An amicus brief submitted in State Farm v. Campbell 12 signed by twentyone social scientists and legal scholars, including the present author, one of the drafters of the
brief, offered their professional opinion that the broad policy claims of the Exxon- funded authors
were not justified. 13
Yet, for several reasons there is a serious danger that these critiques will be ignored by
judges, legislators and other policy makers. First, the “outlier” awards involving high punitive to
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Brief of Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell , 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
8
Cooper Industries, Inc v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001)
9
In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86,106 (2002). Punitive Damages if further cited at 110 and 161
10
TVT Records v. Island Jam Music , 279 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2003): at 417 quoting Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages ( With Notes on Cognition and Valuation) 107 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2071 (1998)
“…juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm
caused;” and at 430: “[A]risk of extremely high awards is likely to produce excessive caution in risk-averse
companies. Hence unpredictable awards create both unfairness and …inefficiency, in a way that may overdeter
desirable activity.”
11
see Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight Bias, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science Case for
Change, 48 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW 867, 877 (1999); Neil Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make Legal Decisions! And Other
Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 705 (1999); Robert
MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR
723 (1999); Steven Garber, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without
A Solution 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1809 (2000); Robert MacCoun , The Costs and Benefits of Letting Juries
Punish Corporations : Comment on Viscusi, 52 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1821,1827 (2000).
12
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
13
Brief of Amici Curiae of Certain Leading Social Scientists and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents, State
Farm (No.01-1289). Professor Theodore Eisenberg and I drafted the amicus. Many of the ideas and critiques in this
article overlap with parts of that amicus. However, the views that I express in this article are solely my own; I make
no representation that the co-signers of the amicus necessarily agree with my views expressed in this article.
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compensatory damages ratios that have been caused the Supreme Court to struggle with legal
doctrine and that have garnered so much attention in the mass media may be seen as the result of
typical jury behavior that is consistent with the claims of Punitive Damages and its authors.
Second, the eminence of the authors and their prolific outpouring of articles may create the
impression of general scientific consensus about their conclusions. Third, the authors’ claim that
the studies involved “thousands of jury-eligible citizens, on hundreds of mock juries, and on a few
hundred experienced trial judges asked to render punitive damages and verdicts under realistic task
conditions”14 is likely to preempt close scrutiny of the research methodology. 15 Similar to a failure
to read the fine print in a contract, judges and legislators may say “grasshopper” and hastily jump
ahead to the conclusions of Punitive Damages. 16 They will be in error.
Two important reviews of Punitive Damages have recently appeared. Professor Catherine
Sharkey has challenged whether the authors of the book have sufficiently considered the societal
deterrence and compensatory functions of punitive damages. 17 These goals of punitive damages
have been minimized, ignored or rejected in the simulation experiments. She also pointed out that
the authors neglect the role of institutional context and appellate review in controlling extreme jury
awards. 18 Based on her analysis she argued that, while the authors of Punitive Damages “have
done an admirable job of producing and analyzing empirical data, their policy prescriptions go too
far in using that data to castigate the jury, and not far enough in suggesting logical reforms within
our existing system.”19 She also argued that the “call to banish the jury in the realm of punitive
damages is at best premature, at least on the basis of their empirical findings.”20
14

PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 211.
The sheer number of experiments as well as the number of subjects used in the research are likely to impress even
careful scholars and judges. For instance, Professor Catherine Sharkey’s review of Punitive Damages, while critical of
aspects of the research, states that “[t]he sheer scope the collective research endeavor is unprecedented,” and “draws
upon experimental research based upon twenty experimental studies involving more than 8,000 jury-eligible citizens
and more than 600 mock juries,.” Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Jurors Decide? 82 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 382, 386 (2003).
16
This is not to say that judges are incapable of reading the methodology or putting it into context, merely that their
attention is centered on the legal issues. However, as I will show, some of the methodological issues are subtle and
might easily escape even a careful judge not trained in social science research.
17
Catherine Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Jurors Decide? 82 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 382,400 (2003); see also
Catherine Sharkey,, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE . L. J. 347 (2003).
18
Sharkey, Punitive Damages at 404. See also, Neil Vidmar, supra note 11 at 711. In his introduction to PUNITIVE
DAMAGES, Professor George Priest briefly acknowledges judicial review in a footnote, see PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 16,
note 17.
19
Sharkey , Should Jurors Decide, supra note 17 at 383.(Scientists use the word data as a plural and datum to refer to
the singular but Sharkey’s reference to “that data” rather than “those data” reflects a contemporary trend in lay usage
of “data”.)
20
Id. at 385.
15

5

Professor Neal Feigenson conducted an extensive review of Punitive Damages. 21 He noted
that the book should have given greater attention to real world research on punitive damages and to
the normative criteria against which jury decisions should be judged. He also documented
shortcomings of some of the experiments. While acknowledging that many of the findings from
the experiments seem consistent with other research findings, he concluded that “…in various
ways, generally small in themselves but cumulatively hard to ignore –sometimes in the design of
the experiments, more frequently in the language employed to characterize their findings and in the
selective use (or more often, neglect) of other empirical data to provide a context for their
findings—the authors’ normative position leads them to present their results tendentiously.”22
Feigenson’s critique also offered the view that Punitive Damages’ emphasis on optimal
deterrence to the exclusion of retribution as an additional purpose of punitive damages limits the
usefulness of its conclusions. 23
The Sharkey and Feigenson articles should be read carefully because they present a
compelling critique of aspects of the research in Punitive Damages. I am in agreement with almost
all of their basic conclusions, but in this article I go much further.
First, I draw attention to Feigenson’s observation that there are data from the real world
that do not support the broad conclusion that juries are incompetent and unreliable and antibusiness. 24 The failure of the authors of Punitive Damages to address this body of data is a serious
shortcoming. I then turn to critical aspects of the simulation experiments that are not sufficiently
engaged in the Feigenson and Sharkey reviews, namely the extent to which the simulation
experiments in Punitive Damages replicate the real world of the jury trial and the context in which
juries make decisions, a problem that social scientists label “ecological validity.” As my analysis
will show, the evidence and arguments in the simulation “trials” were not only very brief but,
21

Neal Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently? 78 CHICAGO -KENT LAW REVIEW 101 (2002).
Id. at 105.
23
Id. at 147.
24
Id. at 244, 250-5, 255-56. Throughout the program of research various of the authors have asserted or implied that
jurors are anti-business. See PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 64, 73, 113-14, 233. In an article published prior to the book
Hastie et al, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Punitive Damages, 22 LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 287 (1998), a conclusion Vidmar, supra note 11 at 712, I found not supportable from their data. I do not
address this matter further in this article but the reader is referred generally to Valerie Hans, BUSINESS ON TRIAL
(2000), especially Chapters 5, 6 and 7, for research showing that jurors are not inherently anti-business nor do they
make compensatory awards based on the wealth of the defendant, the so-called “deep pockets” effect though they do
sometimes hold businesses to higher standards of accountability. See also, Robert MacCoun, Differential Treatment of
Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep Pockets” Hypothesis, 30 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW
121 (1966); Neil Vidmar, M EDICAL M ALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE M YTHS ABOUT JURY
INCOMPETENCE , DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS (1995) at Chapter 18, pp.203-220.
22
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additionally, excluded features of real trials, such as arguments and counter-damage proposals by
the defendant. Further, there are serious problems with the design of some of the experiments. The
imbalance of information provided to the simulating jurors overwhelmingly favored the plaintiff
and undermined the various experiments’ ability to allow scientifically appropriate causal
inferences. These omissions and commissions raise serious doubts about conclusions that can be
drawn from Punitive Damages.
Before turning to the task of examining the methodology in Punitive Damages two matters
need to be emphasized as strongly as possible. First, this article does not take issue with the
Supreme Court’s attempts to address the issue of “outlier” punitive damages awards, particularly
the concern with the ratios between punitive and compensatory damages. 25 I leave doctrine to
judges, except insofar as the doctrine is based on false empirical assumptions.
Second, this article is not a condemnation of experimental simulation research. 26
Simulation experiments can shed important light on basic individual or group decision processes..
Sometimes they are the only practical way to investigate an important legal issue; combined with
other data, they can yield data having direct policy or fact implications. 27 The issue regarding
Punitive Damages is whether it is permissible to make broad sweeping policy statements from the
simulation research reported in the volume, no matter how many experiments were undertaken or
how prominent the authors are, when those data are contradicted by real world data, when the
experiments leave out or distort features that are inherent parts of real world juries’ decisionmaking contexts and when there are confounds in the experimental designs that prejudice the
researchers’ ability to draw valid causal inferences.
A comment on terminology. Throughout this article many references are made to the
persons who participated as subjects in research studies. There are many conventions for labeling

25

See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559 (1996); Cooper Tool Industries Inc v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001); State Farm v. Campbell ; See also Marcia Coyle, New Battles Come over Punitives: High
Court’s Guides Include Ratios 25 NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL PA1, April 14,2003.
26
Indeed, my own vita contains a substantial number of published studies involving jury simulations and I have cited
experimental simulation research in legal testimony when it is consistent with other evidence: see , e.g. Neil Vidmar,
M EDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE M YTHS A BOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE , DEEP
POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS, U. of Michigan Press , 1995 at Chapter s 18 and 19 and Vidmar
Case Studies of Pre -and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and Civil Litigation, LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 26, 73
(2002) http://www.law.duke.edu/pub/vidmar/pretrialPublicity.pdf>
27
E.g. see, Shari Diamond and Judith Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and Testing Jury Instructions.
79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups
and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 603 (1998).
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these persons: “subjects,” “respondents,” “simulating jurors,” “jurors” and “persons.” I use these
various terms intercha ngeably.

II. Punitive Damages in the Real World
One of the most striking observations that can be made about Punitive Damages is the
paucity of references the authors make to real world studies of the incidence and magnitude of
punitive damages. More than a few such studies do exist and one cannot but wonder why those
findings are ignored, particularly since they do not lend support to Punitive Damages’ broad
claims about a widespread problem of frequent and “incoherent” judgments. These real world
studies have shown that punitive awards are generally infrequent. When punitive awards are
rendered, they most often occur in intentional tort cases involving financial matters. Generally,
punitive awards are modest in comparison to compensatory awards.
One of the reasons that these studies may not have received more attention from judges,
legal scholars and commentators is that they are usually presented in the form of rather austere
aggregate statistics, often accompanied by regression analyses or other arcane, albeit important,
methods of assessing data sets.
Mary Rose and I described data from Florida state courts between 1989 and 1998 that
attempted to put a more concrete face on real world punitive damage awards by breaking the data
into categories, comparing ratios of punitive damages to compensatory damages and describing the
nature of “outlier awards.”28 Our data showed that the actual number of punitive damage awards in
Florida from 1989 through 1998 averaged about 23 cases per year. 29 Moreover, slightly over 23
percent involved modest punitive awards against impaired drivers. 30 The next biggest category
involved claims of fraud and other financial losses (just over 17 percent) and the third largest
number of cases involved claims of physical and sexual assaults (about 16 percent). 31 Product
liability cases accounted for only slightly over 7 percent of cases and a closer examination of these
cases revealed that most involved asbestos claims from the early part of the 1990s decade. 32
Responding to the legal controversy involving the ratio between punitive and compensatory
28

Vidmar and Rose, Punitive Damages by Juries In Florida: In Terrorem and In Reality, 38 HARVARD JOURNAL ON
LEGISLATION, 487 (2001).
29
Id. at 492.
30
Id. at 495.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 496.
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awards, 33 we examined the data further to assess the ratio of punitive awards to compensatory
awards by types of cases. 34 These data are reproduced in Table 1. 35

33

See note 26 supra.
Vidmar and Rose, supra note 29 at 501. The ratios reported in this column are the medians of the individual ratios.
35
Id. at 501, designated as Table 3 in the original article. Research currently in progress will expand this data set and
further examine the relationship between punitive and compensatory damages in greater detail.
34
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Table 1. Distribution of me dian total and punitive awards and the median ratio of
punitive to compensatory awards, by case type (1988 – 2000)

Type of case

N
cases

Median
Total
Award

Motor vehicle accidents

63

$284,736

$21,579

0.1:1

Fraud, contract violation, and
other financial damage cases

47

$392,158

$318,055

1.0:1

Assaults

43

$221,461

$59,832

0.4:1

Products liability

20

$2,245,635

$666,936

0.8:1

Information violations (privacy,
slander, defamation, libel)

20

$191,264

$108,530

1.1:1

False imprisonment/false arrest

20

$234,752

$139,814

0.4:1

Premises liability

17

$933,660

$200,081

0.5:1

Discrimination/ harassment

13

$1,344,841

$1,030,530

2.3:1

Professional negligence

12

$3,078,133

$1,006,172

2.5:1

Workplace injuries/ fa ilure to pay
benefits

11

$317,260

$71,820

0.5:1

Other: Improper treatment of dead
persons

4

$3,434,572

$3,052,075

6.3:1

270

$612,028

$151,871

0.7:1

Overall

Median
Punitive
Award

Pun: Comp
Ratio
(median)

Note: Awards adjusted to 1999 dollars.
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Table 1 shows that the median ratios ranged from 0.1:1 in impaired driver accidents to
6.3:1 in four cases involving improper treatment of deceased persons. The median punitive
damages ratio in products liability cases was 0.8:1. Considering all cases, the average punitive
damages award was only 68 percent of the compensatory award. 36
Examination of the claims made by the plaintiffs in most of the cases led to the conclusion
that there was a prima facie case for punitive damages. 37 For instance, in one case the plaintiff
alleged that a company, cited previous time for dumping toxic chemicals, dumped chemicals in a
dumpster that killed two young boys. 38 In another case the plaintiff alleged that the captain of a
cargo ship ignored warnings about dangerous levels of carbon monoxide and failed to inform the
Coastguard about the condition, killing one of the rescuers who had come to the aid of a
crewman. 39 Other cases were similar. Businesses engaging in commonly accepted practices or
those taking normal safety precautions were rarely assessed punitive damages. 40 Moreover, when
both a business and an individual were jointly named in a lawsuit, the business was often found
liable for compensatory damages but in 36 percent of these cases only the individual defendant
was assessed punitive damages, suggesting that the juries differentiated between behaviors of
defendants and were not necessarily anti-business.
The use of the median statistic can obscure the presence of large awards, and indeed there
were some very large awards in some cases. 41 Yet, a closer examination of the top twenty awards
yielded interesting insights. Six of these “mega” awards involved cases in which the defendants
were not represented by a lawyer and a seventh case involved a company already in bankruptcy
and facing criminal charges. Other awards were denied in post-trial review or subjected to
remittitur, and at the time of the reports, still other cases had pending motions about the award. 42
Overall, at least half of the mega awards resulted in no payment to the plaintiff or a reduced
payment. 43

36

Id. at 503.
Id. at 496-499.
38
Perez v. William Recht Co., No.92-8983, 1995 WL 861061 ( Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept 28, 1995)
39
Tabil v. Juno Marine Agency, Inc., No. 88-45327-CA-22, 1998 WL 355212 ( Fla Cir.Ct., Feb 23, 1998).
40
Vidmar and Rose, supra note 29 at 499.
41
In one instance the jury awarded $1 in compensatory damages and $14,000 in punitive damages, a 14,000:1 ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages. As this example illustrates one or two aberrant cases can distort statistical means
and standard deviations. There are statistical ways to control for such extreme values and these will be explored in
future research with the data.
42
Id. at 503-506.
43
Id. at 506.
37
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Other Real World Research Studies
While our Florida data present a detailed picture of only one state jurisdiction during a span
of a dozen years, a substantial number of additional studies collected by various independent
researchers in private and government institutions and in universities 44 have produced findings
generally consistent with the Florida data reported above. 45 While it is not my purpose here to
review this research in detail, a few examples are illustrative. Michael Rustad studied twenty- five
years of punitive damages in products liability cases. 46 His findings indicated that punitive verdicts
are rare, tend to be proportionate to the wrongdoing and tend to be based upon avoidable patterns
of corporate recklessness. 47 A U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics study indicated that in 1996 the
median punitive damage award for all jury trial cases nationwide was $50,000. 48
The RAND Institute for Civil Justice studied punitive damages occurring in selected
jurisdictions for a period extending from 1960 through 1994. 49 Researchers in that organization
concluded that punitive damages were awarded rarely, and mostly in business disputes and

44

Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
IOWA L. RE V.1 (1992); Rustad and Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting
Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters ,” 47 RUTGERS L.RE V. 975 (1995); Peterson, et al. Punitive Damages:
Empirical Findings, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987); Rustad and Koenig, Reconceptualizing
Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters,” 47 RUTGERS
L.RE V. 975 (1995); Rottman et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990's, 79 JUDICATURE
223 (1996); C. DeFrances and M. Litras Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin, September, 1999; Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. OF LEGAL
STUDIES 623 (1997); Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since 1985, The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND
Corporation (1996); Daniels and Martin, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); Moller, Pace and Carroll,
Punitive Damages In Financial Injury Jury Verdicts, 28 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 283 (1999); Eisenberg, La
Fountain, Rottman, and Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL LAW REVIEW
743 (2002) ; Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 W ISC. L. REV.169 (1998); 44
Karpoff and Lott, On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards, XLII JOURNAL OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 527 (1999); Rustad, Unravelling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 W ISCONSIN
LAW REVIEW 15 (1998).
45
One of these studies, by Karpoff and Lott, supra note 44, assessed the magnitude of punitive damages against the
type of lawsuit and the defendant company, variables accounting for only between one and two percent of the variance
(at 571), causing the authors to conclude that punitive awards are highly variable and unpredictable. However, there
were only two variables and they were such gross measures that this conclusion cannot be taken seriously. On the
other hand it is important also to note that these same authors compared punitive awards to compensatory awards; the
punitive award was was positively and significantly related to the compensatory award (at 543).
46
Michael Rustad, supra note 44..
47
For a review and summary of nine studies actual jury verdicts in punitive damages cases see, Thomas Koenig and
Michael Rustad, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW (2001) at 180-184..
48
C. DeFrances and M. Litras CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1996, Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin, September, 1999.
49
Peterson, et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987).
Moller, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, The Institute for Civil Justice, RAND Corporation (1996).
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intentional tort cases, and that, generally, the awards were modest in relation to compensatory
damages. Another Institute For Civil Justice report covered the period 1985 to 1994 and involved
15 state courts of general jurisdiction. 50 With respect to punitive damages, the report concluded:
“[p]erhaps the most striking finding that emerges from the jury verdict data in this study is that
punitive damages are awarded very rarely.” The report also concluded: “The discussion about
punitive damages focuses primarily on products liability, but in jurisdictions we examined, most
punitive damages were awarded in intentional tort and business cases....” and “[i]n contrast,
products liability was the underlying cause of action in only 4.4 percent of the punitive damage
awards made.”
Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin at the American Bar Foundation examined punitive
damages from a number of locations around the United States over twenty-one years. While
finding some variations across jurisdictions they concluded that juries did not routinely award
punitive damages, and that median awards tended to be modest. 51
In 1998 Michael Rustad reviewed nine studies based on real world empirical data. 52 He
observed that there are many things that are unknown about punitive damages but concluded that
Every empirical study of punitive damages demonstrates that there is no
nationwide punitive damages crisis. The research shows that punitive
damages cluster in business tort and intentional tort cases, not personal
injury. The increase in punitive damages is largely confined to a few
jurisdictions. 53
Eisenberg et al. compared judge versus jury trial outcomes in 45 of the nation=s largest
counties in 1996.77 After controlling for differences in the types of cases heard by each set of
decision makers, those authors concluded that there was no substantial evidence that judges and
juries differed ne ither in the rate at which they awarded punitive damages nor in the basic ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages. Jury trials did have a greater range of punitive damages for a
given level of compensatory damages but in the end, those authors concluded, there were only a
“trivially” few cases in which the jury award would have exceeded what a judge might have
awarded.
50
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Some of the real world studies have also addressed the issue of post-verdict adjustments of
punitive awards. 54 Generally, these studies found that very large verdicts were adjusted downward
by trial or appellate judges or through settlements. Indeed, it is worthwhile noting that these
findings are consistent with a study by one of the authors of Punitive Damages. Professor Viscusi
concluded that in products liability cases involving punitive damages
“plaintiffs received only 29% of the original punitive award. Courts often
reduce punitive damages on appeal, and defendants may negotiate a
reduction in this amount in return for prompt payme nt of the damages
amount.”55
Contradicted Claims
The real world studies and the conclusions drawn by their respective authors have been
widely available to researchers. Yet, while hardly acknowledging these adverse data, Punitive
Damages makes the grand claim in Chapter 1:
To our knowledge, there is not a single instance in which our results
disagree with findings from other experiments conducted by independent
groups of behavioral researchers or with any findings from the statistical
analysis of actual trial verdicts.56 (italics added)
In Chapter 12 summarizing the series of studies the claim is modified slightly:
Support for the claim that dollar awards are erratic has accumulated in
research based on analyses of archival award statistics demonstrating the
unpredictability of jury punitive damages awards in actual courtrooms. Our
reading of this controversial literature is that jury verdicts are highly
variable for similar cases, especially across jurisdictions. 57
One study cited in Chapter 12 and discussed again in Chapter 13, 58 was to an empirical
study by Eisenberg et al. 59 The abstract to that article reads, in part:
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Peterson, et al. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, Institute for Civil Justice. RAND Corporation (1987);
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…this article shows a strong and statistically significant correlation between
compensatory and punitive damages. … In addition we find no evidence
that punitive damages awards are more likely when individuals sue
businesses than when individuals sue individuals. With respect to award
frequency, juries rarely award punitive damages and appear to be especially
reluctant to do so in the areas of law that have captured the most attention,
products liability and medical malpractice. Punitive damages are most
frequently awarded in business/contract cases and intentional tort cases. The
frequency-of-award findings are consistent with all major studies of punitive
damages. 60
While the authors of Punitive Damages are entitled to interpret studies differently than the
original authors of these various real world studies, it is peculiar that they did not acknowledge the
studies and give reasons why the findings should be interpreted differently. 61

III. Methodological Issues in Simulation Research:
Context for Interpreting the Experiments in Punitive Damages

Real world data derived from archival analyses do not provide direct insights into jury
decision-processes. They provide only the end results. Comparing the results with other variables
allows us to make inferences about how jurors behave, but the inferences are indirect. One way to
discover how juries decide punitive damages would be observations of juries as they deliberate,
but with one notable exception this has not been allowed for legal policy reasons. 62 Another way is
to randomly assign some real world juries to deliberate under some instructions or conditions

“awards” were reflected in settlements, a dubious undertaking since the characteristics of settled cases are so different
from cases that go to trial, see generally, Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
litigation System –and Why Not?, 140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1147 (1992); Vidmar N. Pap and
Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us about Jury Behavior and the Tort System. 27 SUFFOLK
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1205 (1994/1996).
59
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60
Id. at 623.
61
Feigenson, supra note 21 at 250 and 255-6 also raises similar points about the failure of the authors of PUNITIVE
DAMAGES to confront data bearing on actual jury verdict on punitive damages.
62
See Diamond, Vidmar, Rose, Ellis and Murphy, Juror Discussions During Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 A RIZONA LAW REVIEW 1 (2003); Diamond and Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Evidence, 87 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1857 (2001). Systematic post-verdict interviews with jurors is still another
method, but it has problems involving the accuracy and reliability of juror recall, see Paula L. Hannaford et al.,
Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 359 (2000); Paula
L. Hannaford-Agor et al., “Speaking Rights”: Evaluating Juror Discussions During Civil Trials , 85 JUDICATURE 237
(2002).
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while others deliberate under different conditions, but this too, usually conflicts with legal policy. 63
Even in the extremely rare instances in which juries deciding real cases have been studied,
problems of differences of confounding variables within trials and between different trials remain.
Although these confounds can be minimized through various statistical measures, an alternative
way of gaining knowledge is through simulation research.
Experimental simulations involving human behavior, including jury behavior, are widely
used in the behavioral sciences and in other disciplines as well. Punitive Damages is correct in its
assertion that systematic experimentation is a “venerable and widely used method of scientific
investigation,”64 and “used routinely in engineering, medical and beha vioral research.”65
Experimental methods allow causal inferences by controlling variables that are confounded in the
real world. 66 However, applying data from simulation studies to real world problems, particularly
problems involving broad policy changes, presents complications that require a great deal of
caution, including close attention to methodological details. Consider three important social
science concepts: internal validity, external validity and ecological validity.
Social scientists refer the extent to which extraneous variables are controlled as the
problem of internal validity.67 The more extraneous variables are controlled the more likely that a
relationship between one variable and another can be inferred to be causal. Experimental studies of
jury simulations can control variables and thus have the potential to be high in internal validity.
For example, if we are concerned about whether one form of jury instruction is superior to others
different instructions can be given to different sets of simulating jurors who hear the same
summary of trial evidence; then the jurors’ comprehension under the differing instructions can be
assessed. Because all of the trial evidence and the form and manner in which it is presented is
exactly the same across trials, any differences between types of instructions can be assumed to be
due to the instructions. Alternative explanations can be ruled out. A causal link is established and
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we can say the experiment is high in internal validity. 68 But achieving high internal validity usually
has costs. By controlling some variables the interplay of other variables as they occur in the real
world and interact with one another is often altered.
Thus, even if a causal link is established in a particular experiment, we can ask if the results
are robust enough that they transcend the subject population or the particular trial evidence or the
particular moment in time. If the above experiment on jury instructions used college students as
jurors would we get the same results with a non-student group of jury-eligible voters? Would the
results be the same using jury-eligible persons from Texas as opposed to jury-eligible persons from
Massachusetts? Would they obtain if the case was changed, say, from a medical malpractice case
to a case involving investment fraud? Would an experiment involving a criminal defendant
identified as being from an Arab country yield different results if it was carried out prior to
September 11, 2001 as opposed to after that date? 69 To the extent that the results generalize across
these various settings, the study may be seen to have external validity.70
Concerns about external validity can be partially overcome when the simulation
experiments are conducted in a variety of different settings or under different conditions showing a
certain amount of consistency, or generalizability. This, in fact, is one of the claims made by the
authors of Punitive Damages, namely that they have achieved “repeated replication of the research
results across experimental tests within the research program, and from replication in independent
research programs.”71
But there is a third validity issue that is of concern. All simulation experiments, whether in
the social, biological or physical sciences, are only analogues. They differ in the degree to which
there is verisimilitude between the experimental context and the real world. Some jury
experiments, for example, have present respondents with only a short one- or two-page description
of trial evidence in order to assess the effects of a certain variable that was hypothesized to have an
influence on jury decision-making. One such experiment presented groups of jurors and groups of
judges with brief trial concerning a products liability case. It varied conditions bearing on
inadmissible evidence in order to test whether judges were as susceptible to inadmissible evidence
68
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as jurors. 72 (They were !) Other experiments attempt to mimic the real world as closely as possible
within certain constraints. Thus, one experiment exploring the effect of trial procedures on punitive
damages created a trial script based on an actual trial that contained all the elements of the trial,
including presentations by the plaintiff and defendant and instructions by the judge. 73 Different
versions of parts of the trial were created to test hypotheses about weak or moderately strong
evidence favoring the plaintiff and about the effects of unitary or bifurcated trials. 74 Professional
actors played the roles of the lawyers and the judge in a courtroom and a two and one- half hour
videotape trial was produced. Jury-eligible persons were recruited to serve as jurors. These
simulating jurors were exposed to a form of voir dire, watched the trial and deliberated to a verdict.
Although differences in the degree of verisimilitude was quite substantial, both experiments
described above produced useful knowledge.
Nevertheless, even the most complex simulation does not create all the conditions of the
real world. Applying its results directly to policy must be treated with some caution, even if the
findings are replicated in other experiments. Most social science researchers explicitly recognize
this issue in their articles, the problem of ecological validity.
As described by Professor Marilynn Brewer in a leading social psychology research
manual:
The question of whether an effect holds up across a wide variety of people
or settings is somewhat different than asking whether the effect is
representative of what happens in everyday life. This is the essence of
ecological validity—whether an effect has been demonstrated to occur under
conditions that are typical for the population at large.
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Representativeness is not the same as robustness. Generalizability in the
robustness sense asks whether an effect can occur across different settings
and people; ecological validity asks whether it [a finding or set of findings]
does occur in the world as it is. 75
It is for this reason that writings about the theory of social psychology emphasize that
experimentally derived data, regardless of how many experiments are conducted, must be checked
against the real world, especially when policy recommendations are made from the research. 76
Thus, to quote Brewer again:
When the research is essentially descriptive, ecological validity may be
essential. When the purpose is utilitarian, robustness of an effect is
particularly critical. The fragility and non-generalizability of a finding may
be a fatal flaw if one’s goal is to designing an intervention to solve some
applied problem. 77
Lawyers will quickly see that ecological validity has a close similarity to the relevancy
requirement of F.R.E. 702, as articulated in the Daubert cases. 78 Particularly germane is the
second prong of Rule 702, namely the degree of “fit” between scientific evidence and the
contested issues in the case. 79 No matter how rigorous the methodology and number of replications
(producing internal validity and external validity) the research must have “fit” to the problem at
hand. In the remand decision, commonly called Daubert II, evidence derived from structure
activity, in vitro and in vivo experiments was judged to not have the same “fit” in proving
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Bendectin was a teratogen as epidemiological studies showing no established relationship with
birth defects in humans. 80
The problem of the ecological validity of jury experiments has received considerable
attention in the research literature 81 and is not settled, but, at minimum, prudence should be
exercised in recommending major policy changes bearing on juries from simulation experiments,
especially when they are at variance with real world data.

IV. The Experiments on Punitive Damages:
Major Problems of Ecological and Internal Validity

Although they ignore most real world data in deference to their experiments, the authors of
Punitive Damages concede some problems of generalizability, acknowledging that simulation
experiments cannot “replicate the sense of gravity and importance of a courtroom decision.”82
They report that every effort was made to ensure realism: e.g. “Most of the experimental
cases were based on real decided cases; jury instructions were taken directly from actual trials; and
only citizens eligible to serve on real juries were sampled as research participants.”83
In consequence, Punitive Damages addresses the problem of generalizing to the real world
in the following summary:
An obviously central question is whether our results are reflected in
behavior in the real world. An initial reason to believe that they are is that
many of the tasks were quite realistic. As compared with real jurors, our
mock jurors’ job was simplified, but it incorporated the basic responsibilities
of the real world jurors. A second reason comes from the repeated
replication of research results across experimental tests within the research
program, and from replications in independent research programs. 84
It is important to look more closely at those experiments. A closer look reveals severe
limitations on this claim. By first asking about ecological validity more than a few red flags about
80
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making major policy recommendations from their findings appear. Additionally, the scrutiny of the
experimental materials for ecological validity reveals problems that bear on internal validity and in
one instance raises questions about the correspondence of findings across settings, that is external
validity.

Real World Juries
In the introduction to Punitive Damages Professor George Priest reviews the basic
procedural context in which real world juries decide punitive damages. 85 This context includes the
voir dire process, opening statements, a trial involving evidence about liability and compensatory
damages; and a decision about whether punitive damages are warranted. If punitive damages are
deemed to be warranted, in a separate phase of the trial the jury hears evidence and arguments
about the degree of misbehavior of the defendant and any remorse or other mitigating factors on
the part of the defendant. 86 Finally, the jury receives instructions from the judge about how to
decide those damages. Priest mentions in passing that it is also “increasingly common” for the
plaintiff’s lawyer to make reference to the defendant’s wealth “though only in general terms.”87
While this is a reasonable description of the basic components of the trial process,
Professor Priest underplays the substance of what the jury hears at trial. Over a period of days or
weeks the jury will be exposed to many documents and witnesses. This evidence will bear not only
on the liability and compensatory damages but also on the behavior of the plaintiff and defendant.
Jurors may see documents that reflect calculated behavior and reckless greed on the part of a
defendant individual or organization, such as incriminating memoranda outlining deception or
reckless behavior in the face of clear warnings. They may hear testimony from civilian or expert
witnesses who corroborate the documents or supply additional details bearing on more than just
85
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careless malfeasance. The jurors may hear first hand about the impact of this behavior on the
victims. They may hear testimony bearing negatively on the credibility of plaintiff and defense
witnesses or even see witnesses for either side exposed as liars during cross-examination. Jurors
may also hear about the behavior of the defendant in previous incidents, in both the liabilitycompensatory phase and punitive phase of the trial. In the punitive phase they likely will hear
arguments from defense counsel about the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior given what
was known beforehand or about mitigating circumstances. 88 The jurors may hear expert evidence
from both sides about the ability of the defendant to bear the economic burden of a punitive
damage award. The defense may offer their own figures to rebut the plaintiff’s suggested amount
of punitive damages during final arguments, thus providing a counter-anchor to the plaintiff’s ad
damnum. The jury will be instructed to weigh all of this evidence with a plethora of knowledge
gained during the first phase of the trial. Finally, the jurors, ranging between six and twelve in
number, will be required to deliberate on the issues to reach a unanimous (or super- majority)
verdict.
The above supplement to Professor Priest’s summary thus reminds us that real world jurors
do not begin the punitive phase of the trial with a blank slate about misbehavior. Nor does the
punitive phase necessarily involve only the plaintiff presenting evidence and arguments; the
defendant is allowed to present evidence and arguments. In short Priest’s summary of the punitive
damages process underplays the knowledge and education that the jury obtains during the trial.
When the jury receives its instructions from the judge on how to decide punitive damages it
has a great deal of background information against which to interpret those instructions and reach a
verdict. In Florida, for example, the jury is given instructions that it needs “clear and convincing
evidence” that the conduct was so gross or flagrant as to show reckless disregard of human life or
the rights of others or intentional misconduct or gross negligence to decide if punitive damages
should be awarded against the defendant. In the instance of multiple defendants the jury is told that
it may decide punitive damages are warranted against one defendant and not others or against more
than one defendant. 89 In deciding the amount of punitive damages the jury is instructed to consider
the “nature, extent, and degree of misconduct and related circumstances;” “each defendant’s
88
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financial resources”90 and “any other circumstances which may affect the amount of punitive
damages.”91 The jury is also told that any disputed factual issues bearing on the amount to be
assessed as punishment and deterrence to others should be determined by the greater weight of the
evidence. 92
Since the authors of Punitive Damages make such broad policy recommendations we need
to keep these real world facts firmly in mind and compare them to the experiments reported in
Punitive Damages and prior published articles that describe the methodology of the experiments
in greater detail than in the book. We need to ask questions about the degree to which the
simulation experiments accurately mimicked the real world trial process and the degree to which
the presentation of “trial” evidence and instructions was balanced. The first question speaks to
ecological validity and the second speaks, in some important instances, to internal validity. Along
the way some other important questions about validity can be raised.

From Outrage to Erratic Dollars in Eight-Sentence, Truncated “Trials”
Chapter 2 of Punitive Damages reports an experiment that attempted to study jurors’ ability
to decide the dollar amounts of damages. The authors of that chapter conclude that the experiment
demonstrates that jurors are erratic in translating moral judgments about defendant behavior into
dollar awards. 93
Chapter 2 is based on a previously published law review article. 94 That article provides
greater detail about the method and procedure of the experiment. The experiment was conducted
in a “downtown motel” and “[m]ost [of the 899 “jury-eligible”] respondents completed their task
in thirty to forty-five minutes. Each respondent first received three pages of general instructions on
the law. Then, each respondent answered questions about a number of scenarios, ranging from
“about one” to five, concerning an injury suffered by a plaintiff. The scenarios reported that
compensatory damages had already been awarded. The ten personal injury scenarios used in the
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experiment ranged between six and ten sentences in length, with a median length of eight
sentences. 95
After reading each scenario each mock juror was asked to respond to two six-point
“bounded” rating scales measuring how much the defendant should be punished. The first scale
was worded as follows: “ Which of the following best expresses your opinion of the defendant’s
action?” and the participants were provided with a six-point scale anchored at one end by
“Completely Acceptable” and at the other by “Outrageous.” The second question was worded as
follows: “In addition to paying compensatory damages, how much should the defendant be
punished? Please express your opinion of the appropriate level of punishment.” The question was
accompanied by a six-point scale anchored on the respective ends by “No Punishment” and
“Extremely Severe Punishment.” The third question was an “open-ended” scale that asked, “In
addition to paying compensatory damages, what amount of punitive damages (if any) should the
defendant be required to pay as punishment and to deter the defendant and others from similar
actions in the future? Please write your answer in the blank below.”96
The respondents in the experiment did not have the rich evidential context of a real trial,
had not decided upon liability for either compensatory damages nor punitive damages, did not
have the benefit of arguments from plaintiff and defense counsel and did not have the advantage of
testing their personal views against the views of others in a process of deliberation.
In addition to the paucity of information provided to the respondents, a second question
arises about the scales. Do real juries make judgments about the appropriate level of punishment
based on two questions that assess moral outrage on six-point scales? To what extent would those
scale responses assess the egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior? Rating scales are commonly
used in psychological research, but they have limitations and the best approach is to follow them
with open-ended questions asking respondents to explain their reaction in their own words. 97
Would the simulating jurors have responded differently if, in addition, they had been asked to state
their reasoning? Is it logical to compare responses on those bounded scales with the open-ended
dollar scale? To be sure, as Punitive Damages points out, real world verdicts on punitives are
made on open-ended scales, but real world juries do not assess moral reprehensibility on six-point
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bounded scales and without open-ended discussion about the reprehensibility of the behavior or the
specific or general deterrence that might be accomplished by an award of punitive damages. These
considerations place limitations on the ability of the experimental findings to tell us about the real
world.
This experiment needs to be evaluated along with a companion experiment reported in
Chapter 3.

Deliberating About Dollars and Polarization Shifts in One -page, Plaintiff-biased “Trials”
Chapter 3 reports, in the authors’ words, the “results of a massive study of decisions by
mock jurors”98 Simulating jurors were presented with a summary of trial evidence and assigned to
groups to deliberate on a punitive damages verdict. Most of the groups followed a simple majority
rule in reaching their decision. More important, in comparison to the median of individual predeliberation judgments, dollar awards increased after group deliberation. Fully 27 percent of
groups awarded dollar amounts that were as high or higher than the highest pre-deliberation
judgment of any juror and the awards were less consistent and predictable than the mean or median
amount awarded by the individual jurors. The authors of the experiment concluded that their
findings are consistent with the “polarization shift” that has long been demonstrated in social
psychology experiments whereby group discussion shifts pre-deliberation judgments toward
extreme ends of psychometric scales. 99
Chapter 3 is also based on a previously published article that provides greater information
about the experiment’s methodology.
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accompanied with a written script of the narration so that they could follow along. Then,
approximately half of the subjects were asked to make a personal judgment on an eight-point scale
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(a “bounded” scale 102 ) of the degree to which the defendant should be punished 103 while the
remainder of the respondents were asked instead to assess on an “open-ended scale”104 an amount
of damages that the defendant should be required to pay. 105
Next, the respondents were assigned to six-person groups and asked to reach a unanimous
decision on the judgment they had just made individually, that is, either on the eight-point scale or
the open-ended scale involving dollars. Next, they were handed a ne w form asking them to make
an individual personal judgment on the other scale; that is, those who had received the bounded
scale now responded to the open-ended scale and those who had responded to the open-ended scale
now responded to the bounded scale. Finally, the respondents were again assigned to six-person
groups and asked to deliberate to a unanimous decision. During deliberations they were required to
reach their decision in thirty minutes. A total of 91 percent reached a unanimous decision on the
punishment rating and 82 percent reached a unanimous decision on the open-ended dollar award
judgment. 106
Let me be very clear here. The experiment used what is called a “within
participants” design. 107 The procedure of having some subjects respond to one order of questions
while another group of subjects responds in another order is known as counter-balancing for order
effects and is an appropriate way of attempting to control biases that may result from making
decisions in one order versus another and is used to attempt to increase internal validity of an
experiment or survey. 108 “Within participants” experimental designs are commonly used in social
psychology, but they are subject to problems bearing on internal as well as ecological validity. The
internal validity problem is that by being required to make multiple decisions respondents may
answer differently than if they were required to only make one decision. 109 As regards the problem
of ecological validity, the essential point is that the conditions of the experiment do not mimic the
conditions that lead to a single trial verdict on punitive damages that real world juries make.
102

See, Shari Diamond, supra note 97 at 229,251-264 (2000) for a discussion of closed and open-ended scales that are
comparable to the terminology of “bounded” and “open-ended” scales.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES at 45.
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Diamond, supra note 97.
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See, Shadish et al., supra note 66at 115; Charles Judd, et al. RESEARCH M ETHODS IN SOCIAL RELATIONS, 6th Ed.
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review.
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See Brewer, supra note 66 at 22-23. The problem involves arcana of experimental procedure that are beyond the
scope of this article but the reader is encouraged to refer to Brewer on this issue.
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Neither the book chapter nor the article explicitly reports the length of the trial narration,
but the appendix in the original article reports what can be assumed was a typical “trial”
narration. 110 It consisted of one page containing five short paragraphs, a combined total of thirteen
sentences, about a products liability case. The first two paragraphs described the facts of the case:
a child ingested medicine allegedly from a childproof safety cap and permanently weakened her
respiratory system. In one sentence the subjects were told that the trial jury ordered the
manufacturer to pay $200,000 in compensatory damages. Another paragraph consisting of five
sentences laid out the evidence about the manufacturer’s malfeasance. A two-sentence paragraph
summarized the closing arguments by plaintiffs’ counsel and another two-sentence paragraph
summarized the defendant’s closing arguments.
More than the obvious brevity of the stimulus “trial” deserves comment. The facts of the
case are all biased in the plaintiff’s favor: the parents of the child were cautious; the overdose
severely injured the child; the defendant’s childproof caps had a high failure rate and an internal
memo not only downplayed the risks but said that the consequences of this misbehavior were
trivial; there was a prior warning from the FDA. 111 The plaintiff’s closing emphasized these
facts. 112 The two sentences relaying the final arguments of the defendant in the scenario said that
the caps were generally effective and asserted that the FDA warning was “only communicated to
them verbally.”113 In total, of the thirteen sentences comprising all of the facts and arguments in
the trial, only two presented the defendant’s position, a plaintiff to defendant ratio of 5.5:1. 114
Do real juries have such minimal facts and arguments upon which to make their judgments
and in such a biased presentation? Are they told that another trial jury decided compensatory
damages were warranted? 115
Similar to the question raised about the experiment in Chapter 2 we need to ask: Do real
juries make judgments about the appropriate level of punishment based on a simple instruction
asking, “How much should the defendant be punished because of their actions and to deter the
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Sentences favoring the plaintiff also included some long compound sentences so this is a conservative estimate of
the plaintiff to defense ratio.
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Obviously in some rare instances a different jury may be asked to decide only the punitive damages portion of the
trial as when a defendant concedes liability and compensatory damages but contests the punitive damages or as when a
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defendant and others from similar action in the future?” by responding to an eight-point scale
anchored at one end by “None” and at the other by “Extremely Severe”? Is it reasonable to
compare responses on that bounded scale with the open-ended scale dollar scale? To what extent
would that scale response, first individually and then through deliberation, affect responses to later
dollar amounts compared to the discussion that real jurors might have about the egregiousness of
the defendant’s behavior in their deliberations? As described above, some of the subjects were first
directed to award an amount of damages without first giving considered attention to the
egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior. But does that happen in real juries, especially under
such minimal fact and argument conditions?
There is more. The authors of the research found that group deliberation among the
simulating jurors tended to enhance the size of awards preferred by the individual jurors in the
half hour allowed before deliberations were terminated. This led to the following conclusion:
We have found that…deliberation makes low-punishment judgments
decrease and high-punishment judgments increase. It also makes –and this is
our most important finding –dollar awards generally increase, while making
high-dollar awards substantially increase, in a general severity shift.116
In the discussion of these findings 117 the authors correctly report the extensive literature on
the “polarization shift” that has shown that such shifts frequently occur in a variety of settings 118
and that the phenomenon is likely to occur under two conditions: when the arguments of the
various group members tend to be in the same direction and when the y adjust their views to
conform with a perceived social consensus. 119
But now consider that, as described above, the facts and arguments in the thirteen- sentence
trial summary were overwhelmingly in favor of the plaintiff. Under such conditions we can
reasonably expect that most arguments and opinions generated by the simulating jurors would tilt
toward the plaintiff and against the defendant. Putting it bluntly, the experiment did not provide a
fair and balanced presentation of evidence. 120 A more balanced presentation might well have
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obtained either no shift or more shifts toward lesser amounts of damages because the simulating
jurors would have been able to consider off-setting arguments favoring the defendant. 121
In summary, the gulf between the experimental simulation and the real world was wide, an
ecological validity problem. In addition the trial summary presented to the simulating jurors
contained no evidence favoring the defense. The imbalance in information provided to the
simulating jurors involves a problem of internal validity because it does not allow us to rule out a
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM 227 (1999). Reviewing research on the story model the author
referred to findings from experiments conducted on criminal jury decision making as follows:
For example, many criminal cases involve the presentation of only one story, by the prosecution, while the
defense tactic is to ‘raise reasonable doubts’ by attacking the plausibility of that story. In these one-sided
cases, jurors construct only one story, and confidence in the verdict is determined by coherence and fit of the
single story to the verdict category. In this situation, a weak defense story is worse than no story at all; in fact,
a weak prosecution story is bolstered and more guilty verdicts are rendered when a weak defense story is
presented versus no defense story at all. (at 232, footnotes omitted from quotation.)
121
Strikingly, Professor Michael Saks, one of the authors of the Landsman et al. study of punitive damages, supra note
_, suggests that data from that study seems consistent with my hypothesis on this matter. The experiment contained
two versions of evidence, one of which involved weak evidence and the other moderate evidence supporting the
plaintiff’s position on liability. In a personal communication by email on February 18, 2004 Saks offered the following
comments about the Landsman et al. experiment in response to my hypothesis:
The two levels of evidence strength for compensatory liability were pretested to be weak and moderate. In the
moderate strength case, the plaintiff had a good bit of exposure to the defendant's products and smoked barely
at all. In the weak case, the plaintiff had less verifiable exposure to the defendant's products and was a smoker
(so the defendant's compensatory liability was less clear). The evidence on punitive liability was identical in
all conditions. (Our "beryllium" case was modeled after asbestos: the defendants clearly knew and actively
concealed the fatal harm of their product.)
To the jurors' credit, the strength of the compensatory liability case had no effect on either the likelihood of
finding punitive liability (see Table 6) or the amount of punitive damages awarded (see Table 7). As the
compensatory liability of the defendant became more clear, they did not become more likely to find punitive
liability or to award more in punitive damages.
By comparing the damages amounts for certain conditions in Tables 7 and 8, one can see that it is not
apparent that the "amplification" effect hypothesized by Sunstein et al. occurred. That conclusion is even
more clear from looking at the "expected awards" in the decision trees for individual jurors versus
deliberating juries in Figures 1 and 2 at the very end of the article. (Focusing on unitary trials, juries can be
expected to award less in damages than nondeliberating individual jurors.)
In addition consider an experiment by Martin Kaplan and Charles Miller, Judgments and Group Discussion:
Effect of Presentation and Memory Factors on Polarization, 40 SOCIOMETRY 337 (1997). Some simulating juries
listened to a tape-recording of facts incriminating a criminal defendant while others heard exonerating facts. Some
jurors heard the facts in the same order (homogeneous order) and others heard them in a different order (heterogeneous
order). The experiment found that, as hypothesized, a greater number of facts were remembered and shared by the
juries under the heterogeneous compared to the homogeneous conditions. Moreover, in the exonerating condition there
were group polarization shifts away from a guilt decision and in the incriminating conditions group discussion
produced polarization shifts toward guilt. Although conducted in the context of a criminal trial the polarization shifts
in this experiment are consistent with my suggestion that a more balanced presentation of facts or facts tending to
favor the defendant in the Chapter 4 experiments would have produced no shifts or shifts away from larger punitive
awards.
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plausible alternative causal explanation of the results, namely that rather than a bias on the part of
the jurors the polarization shift was caused by the imbalance of information overwhelmingly
favoring the plaintiff. Viewed from this perspective, generalizations about the effect of jury
deliberations on deciding dollars are hazardous. 122 The conclusions of “higher than expected” and
“greater than appropriate” post-deliberation awards in the study may well be a result of the atypical
conditions and biased presentation under which the subjects operated, not withstanding the fact
that the experiment contained over 3000 subjects.

The Ad Damnum, Simulated Anchoring Effects and AWOL Defense Lawyers
Chapter 4 of Punitive Damages presents two experiments purporting to assess the impact of
the plaintiff’s ad damnum on punitive awards. 123 The experiments were designed to test the
hypothesis that the unbounded task of making dollar awards was likely subject to psychological
anchoring produced by the plaintiff’s ad damnum.124 Chapter 4 concludes that there was a large
effect of the size of the plaintiff’s reward request; the more that was requested the more that was
awarded. 125
Once again consider the methodology of the experiments. 126 The simulating jurors were
told that liability for the accident (an environmental spill of a toxic chemical) had been established
in a prior legal proceeding and the defendant had paid $24.5 million in compensatory damages and
fines. They were further told that the proceeding had determined that the company’s actions
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Although I focus here on the polarization shift, Wissler, Saks and Hart, Decisionmaking about General Damages: A
Comparison of Jurors Judges and Lawyers, 98 M ICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 751, 802, note 147, point out that the claim of
greater variability made by Sunstein et al. confuses the polarization phenomenon with the mass of cases dealing with
punitive damages.
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Hastie, Schkadie and Payne, Do Plaintiffs’ Requests and Plaintiffs Identities Matter?, Chapter 4 of PUNITIVE
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will be ignored here.
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Chapter 4 also reports that the first of the experiments also attempted to assess whether out-of-state defendants, as
opposed to local defendants are treated more harshly. I do not deal further with this part of the experiment except to
note that in summarizing their findings the authors, asserted , id.at 73, that that “…punitive damages amounts were
influenced by the plaintiff’s location,” and followed followed immediately with a contradictory sentence reporting
that “…we did not find statistically reliable effects due to defendant location.” Statistically, it is improper to make a
claim of a finding when the statistical tests do not support the hypothesis. Sometimes authors report a “trend” toward a
certain hypothesis when the data are in the predicted direction of a hypothesis , but no qualification exis ts in the
authors’ summary of findings.
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Id.at 73.
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Chapter 4 is based on Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and
Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 445 (1999).
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constituted reckless conduct and that punitive damages were warranted. 127 They then viewed a
videotaped narration, accompanied by a written summary and instructions. The presentation lasted
35 minutes. 128 The award-anchor conditions were created by varying the plaintiff’s closing
argument, ranging from low to high amounts of suggested damages. 129 Aside from the artificiality
of not being involved in the liability and compensatory stages of the trial or having the advantages
of deliberation, the subjects heard not a word from the defense side about why the punitive
damages should not be so high, nor were they provided with a defense counter-anchor or expert
evidence. (If the case had been a real trial it would appear that the defendant corporation had solid
grounds to sue its counsel for legal malpractice.) In short, compared to real trials, the experiment
presented only the plaintiff’s side of the argument.
Punitive Damages’ assertion that psychological anchoring has been demonstrated in many
experiments in the field of psychology130 is only partly accurate, especially when other
experiments involving simulating jurors deciding compensatory awards are considered. This is an
important matter because Professor Sharkey, critical of other parts of Punitive Damages, has taken
the anchoring effect at face value, concluding, that “[behavioral research has demonstrated that
the anchors selected have a disproportionate influence on the outcome of the decision”131 and,
further, that “Sunstein et al. demonstrate that anchoring effects wreak havoc in the punitive
damages realm.”132 Other law-trained scholars may also accept this conclusion. It is misleading.
Anchor effects are far more complicated than the impression one obtains from reading
Chapter 4, especially when it comes to experimental studies of jury decision- making. Consider an
experiment by Saks et al. 133 In one condition simulating jurors were provided both a low and a
high award amount as anchors. The size of compensatory awards did not differ from a condition
providing no anchors, but the variability of the awards was reduced. Marti and Wissler followed
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The authors, at 63, note 4, cite a review by Payne, Behavioral Decision Research; An Overview, in Michael
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up on this finding in an experiment that varied the amounts that both the plaintiff and the defense
suggested for pain and suffering. 134 The size of the awards and the variability of those awards was
influenced by both the plaintiff request and the defense request. 135
Professors Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein’s book, Determining Damages, devoted to
experimental studies of how juries decide damages, thoroughly reviewed anchoring research as it
relates to jury decisions. 136 Their review considered simulation studies in which the defense
offered a counter- figure to that of the plaintiff, in which expert economic evidence was introduced,
and in which the simulating jurors deliberated. The findings showed that while simulating jurors
were influenced by anchors, 137 the effects were much more nuanced than the Punitive Damages
experiments and their authors suggest: to wit, defense counter- figures had moderating effects. In
an experiment involving deliberations Greene and Bornstein concluded that “[a]pparently jury
awards may be reduced when the defense presents a counter-offer, at least when that amount is
offered by an expert.”138 In other words anchoring effects change when defense evidence and
arguments are introduced. To repeat, such counter-anchors were absent from the Punitive
Damages experiment.
Thus, the simulation studies reported in Chapter 4 not only lack ecological validity, by
among other things, failing to create conditions of evidence and counter-proposals by defendants,
but they also lack external validity when compared to other experimental studies of jury award
behavior. In addition the fact that the materials provided the respondents were heavily weighted in
favor of the plaintiff, similar to the “Deciding Dollars” experiment in Chapter 3, raises problems of
internal validity.
In an article published in the Stanford Law Review subsequent to Punitive Damages
Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade and Ritov acknowledged that “… judgment shifts are easy to
generate in experimental settings”139 (italics added.) Yes, and perhaps we may conclude from
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Chapter 4 that plaintiff anchors do produce judgment shifts when experiments provide only one
side of the evidence and arguments. But real juries operate from a very different context than that
provided in the experiments reported in Chapter 4. The research reported in Chapter 4 presents
very major ecological, external and internal validity problems.

A Study Involving Legal Rather Than Fact Decisions and One -sided Presentation of
Evidence
Chapter 5 describes an experiment ostensibly testing whether individual jurors and
deliberating juries can accurately assess whether liability for punitive damages is warranted. The
respondents in the experiment were provided with four case synopses and asked to determine if the
cases met the legal requirements for liability. The deliberations of the simulating jurors were
videotaped and subsequently analyzed. In three of the four cases the majority of the jurors decided
in favor of the plaintiff, suggesting, the authors proclaim, a pro-plaintiff tilt. 140 The Chapter
concludes, in part, that “the tendency to find the defendant liable was partly due to juries’ failure to
systematically consider the full set of legally necessary conditions of the verdicts they
rendered.”141 It further concludes that jurors displayed low levels of comprehension and memory
for informa tion conveyed in legal instructions. 142 The authors make the following assertion: “We
believe that the essential finding, disturbingly poor comprehension, is a valid description of what
occurs in actual jury trials, although this conclusion is based on our mock-jury simulation, which is
far from courtroom conditions.”143
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In Chapter 5 this assumption is not made explicitly but in the original article upon which the chapter is based , see
Hastie et al, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 LAW
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 287 (1998), the authors made a number of statements implying anti-defendant attitudes on the
part of juries. At the beginning of their article they claimed: “What is incontrovertible is that in a nonnegligible
number of cases juries render distinctly harsh antidefendant judgments and set dramatically large awards,” at 288. In
interpreting their results the authors concluded that “In the cases we studied individual jurors exhibited a persistent
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not,” at 306. The article further speculated that “possibly sympathy for injured plaintiffs led them to ignore essential
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reduce the rate of improper verdicts,” at 308. In a rejoinder and critique of that article, Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make
Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 705, at 712 (1999), I pointed out that the presumption that jury awards favoring plaintiffs do not allow a
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How far was the simulation from courtroom conditions? Chapter 5 is based on an article
that was published previously. 144 In an article published in 1999 I offered a number of serious
grounds of criticism. 145
Most important, I pointed out that there is a fatal conceptual flaw bearing on legal
relevance in the underlying assumption of the experiment. The simulating jurors were asked to
make decisions about whether punitive damages should be allowed. However, the decisions that
the subjects were asked to make were decisions that fell within the province of the trial judge, not
the jury. 146 The case synopses provided to the simulating jurors were ones in which the decision of
the trial judge to allow or not allow punitive damages was appealed. In each case an appeals court
decided that the trial judge, as a gatekeeper on legal issues, should not have permitted the jury to
consider punitive damages. Juries make fact decisions, not legal decisions. As a consequence, the
experiment lacks legal relevance. 147
While the above flaw in legal reasoning underlying the experiment is sufficient grounds for
dismissing Chapter 5 in its entirety, additional problems with the research are worth pointing out.
The experiment created artificial and truncated conditions somewhat similar to the experiments
discussed above. 148 The jurors were told that liability and compensatory damages had already been
144
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Id. at 706-710. The authors of Chapter 5 claim that reliance on the court decision in those cases is not the test of
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Moreover, Professor Feigenson’s review, supra note 21, has pointed out that the authors of Chapter 5 do seem to
intend that the reader infer that the discrepancies between their simulating jurors responses and the actual judicial
outcomes are the appropriate standard. Feigenson at 246, observed:
“…the authors [of Punitive Damages] do seem to intend that readers infer from the discrepancies between
experimental and actual outcomes that the mock juries that voted for punitives erred. They write that they
chose the four cases ‘because they are frequently cited as precedents, and because the proper action on the
issue of punitive damages had been decided as a matter of law by trial or appellate court review of the
original proceedings’ (p.80)(emphasis added by Feigenson), implying that the actual cases create a reliable
benchmark after all. More directly, they write that ‘discussion of issues that were legally relevant reduced the
tendency to decide, incorrectly, that the punitive damages were warranted” (p.90) (emphasis added by
Feigenson).
Moreover, as I pointed out in my original critique of that research, Vidmar, supra note 11at 709-710, in two of the
cases used in the experiment the trial and appellate judges struggled over the issue of whether, under the law, punitive
damages were permissible and were not unanimous in their conclusions; and in the other two cases the issues were
close enough to encourage plaintiff lawyers to file an appeal against the trial judge’s decision to disallow punitives.
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decided and they were only to decide if the evidence supported a finding that punitive damages
were warranted. 149 Thus, there is again the problem of ecological validity because the simulating
jurors did not hear or decide the first part of the case and had a very minimalist version of the facts
and arguments. In addition there are major problems that compromise the experiment’s internal
validity.
The four cases selected to present to the simulating jurors provided only instances in which
the appeal courts concluded that punitives were impermissible under the law. The experiment did
not provide the jurors with comparable cases in which appeals courts determined that punitive
damages were warranted. Would jurors provided with these alternative cases have decided punitive
damages were not warranted? In short an experiment testing whether juries would decide the law
in the same way as judges would have provided juries with “permissible” cases as well as
“impermissible” cases and allowed a test of whether the jurors’ decisions showed a proplaintiff/anti-defendant tilt. 150 Of course, from a practical standpoint devising such an experiment
would only serve to satisfy appropriate experimental rigor since the experiment would still be
legally irrelevant.
There is still more. The simulating jurors also deliberated as well as rendered individual
verdicts. The authors concluded that deliberations produced a tilt in favor of finding that punitive
damages were warranted. The critique which I made of the original article drew attention to the
fact that by including “hung juries,” that is, those who could not reach unanimous verdict in the
allotted time, the researchers inflated the number of juries favoring punitive damages. 151 Since the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff, hung juries should count as favoring no punitives. When the
data are adjusted for this inappropriate counting, the number of juries favoring punitive damages
was only 58 percent. From this insight one could make a plausible argument that, on average, the
experimental juries tended to be relatively comparable to the various judges involved in these
cases who did not garner consensus on the question of whether punitive damages were
warranted. 152
In reviewing that study again I now offer a further criticism. Similar to the experiments
reported in Chapters 2 and 3, the trial materia ls, at least as reflected in the example provided in
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Chapter 5 and in the original article upon which Chapter 5 is based, was heavily biased in favor of
the plaintiff. That case summary, Jardel Company, Inc. v. K. Hughes, 153 consisted of 28
sentences. 154 All of those sentences presented the plaintiff’s side of the story. Two additional
sentences presented the plaintiff’s arguments in favor of punitive damages. 155 The defendant’s
arguments against punitive damages consisted of three sentences. 156 In total, then, the case
summary consisted of 30 sentences favoring the plaintiff and three sentences presenting the
defendant’s side of the case, or a 10:1 ratio of plaintiff information to defendant information. 157
Thus, again in this experiment, we see that the stimulus materials were heavily slanted toward a
finding for the plaintiff. Perhaps such an imbalance of information sometimes occurs in real world
punitive damages cases, but the imbalance in the evidence presented to the jurors is unremarked by
the authors of Punitive Damages 158 although it seems obvious that such an imbalance of
information could--and I submit, probably does-- explain the pro-plaintiff tilt in the data.
In summary, there are major problems in making inferences from the experiments reported
in Chapter 5 that involve legal relevance, ecological validity and internal validity.

Mandated Deterrence and Risk Analysis Experiments Using “Fourteen- Sentence” Trials
The authors of the research in punitive damages appear to be committed to a law and
economics view that the purpose of punitive damages should be primarily (perhaps exclusively) to
deter behavior, rather than also considering the retributive or moral role that punitive damages may
serve. For example, in a reply to a critique of one of their earlier experiments Professors Hastie and
Viscusi stated: “We have described the juror as a risk manager because we believe that the most
useful framework within which to understand the punitive damages decision is to view it as a
governing mechanism that is aimed to deter or control behavior that reduces the general social
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welfare.”159 Although this view is qualified somewhat in Punitive Damages 160 it remains a
significant theme in the book.
Three chapters in Punitive Damages report experiments assessing whether respondents can
appropriately respond to instructions that bear on the probability of deterrence. 161 In one
experiment reported in Chapter 8 samples of jury-eligible citizens and samples of law students
were given brief case summaries that varied the probability of a defendant’s tortious behavior
being detected. 162 Following case synopses involving an injured person, respondents in the
experiment were given the following instructions:
In situations like this, the victims who deserve compensation do not
always receive it because (1) they don’t know what caused their problem
and therefore don’t sue, (2) they don’t know that they can sue, or (3) they
sue and lose, even though they deserve to win under the law , because
their lawyers are not good enough. Research has shown that in only 1 out
of 100 situations where someone has an experience like Joan Glover is the
company eventually required to pay compensation to the victim. 163
Each respondent judged three cases, each of which varied the probability of detection. 164
Although there was a trend for the likelihood of detection to affect dollar judgments it was not
statistically significant and was in a direction opposite to the predicted direction, 165 causing the
authors to conclude that changes in the probability of detectio n did not affect the amounts
awarded.
From the reported instructions it appears that the respondents in the experiment
were not asked to assume the role of jurors, but rather to merely indicate their awards. This poses a
serious problem. In a critique of an earlier experiment in the Exxon corpus of research, also
159
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dealing with judgments of risk, 166 Richard Lempert obtained the questionnaires and raw data from
the experiment. 167 He noted a major methodological flaw affecting the experiment’s internal
validity, namely that rather than receiving identical instructions respondents in one condition were
told to respond as ordinary citizens while in another they were told to assume the role of jurors. 168
Lempert’s reanalysis of the data showed substantial differences between jurors assigned to the role
of jurors compared to persons who received the same instructions who were not assigned to the
role of jurors. 169 While we cannot say whether or how the instructions in Experiment 1 might have
produced different effects if the respondents had been instructed to take the role of jurors,
Lempert’s finding raises serious questions about both its external and ecological validity. 170
A second “experiment” in Chapter 8 involved a survey of law students at the University of
Chicago. 171 They were asked if about the degree to which they agreed with the optimal deterrence
approach to punitive damages by responding to a scenario involving reckless employer safety
practices. The students were not asked to assume the role of jurors. Strikingly, very strong
majorities of the law students rejected a judicial ruling based on optimal deterrence, presumably
because they believed “invidious behavior must be punished.”172
The results of this second experiment bear on the results of research reported in Chapter 9
that asked respondents to apply the Polinsky-Shavell mathematical formula based on optimal
deterrence. 173 Polinsky and Shavell set forth a mathematical formula based on optimal deterrence,
namely that punishment levels should be based on the reciprocal of the probability of detection of
negligent behavior. 174 Those authors proposed model jury instructions using this formula. In the
research reported in Chapter 9 samples of jury eligible adults were exposed to variations of a
summary of an environmental accident case that varied the probability that the defendant’s tortious
166
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behavior would be detected. 175 The respondents were recruited for an opinion survey and were not
allowed the option of considering the degree to which the behavior of the defendant deserved
retributive punishment. The respondents were then presented with three personal injury case
synopses. The longest of these three synopses consisted of fourteen sentences. One of the fourteen
sentences told the jurors that a jury had already determined that the defendant was liable and had
assessed compensatory damages. Without further instructions they were asked to specify the
amount of punitive damages that they believed were appropriate. No other information was given
about the rich factual context out of which the disputes arose, nor did the respondents have an
opportunity to compare their individual views with those of other respondents.
The respondents did not perform well in applying the Polinsky-Shavell hypothesis. It is not
clear what implications this study reported in Chapter 9 has for real world juries. Aside from the
limitations of the stimulus materials used for the trial the Polinsky-Shavell instructions do not
correspond with the instructions that real world jurors are provided, there are additional problems.
The first is that deterrence is only one goal of punitive damages and by artificially limiting the
respondents’ decisions of optimal deterrence the experiment lacked ecological validity. Second, as
Professor Feigenson has pointed out, the Polinsky-Shavell instructions are so complicated that we
should not expect laypersons to be able to apply them readily. 176
Indeed, Chapter 9 reports that “[a]lthough college graduates and those with professional
degrees often did the survey in a manner that followed the Polinsky-Shavell instructions, a
considerable portion of this group did not carry out these instructions.”177 The chapter further notes
that [t]he experiment did not distinguish whether people were unable to implement these
instructio ns or were unwilling to follow these instructions.”
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8 suggests that at least some of the problem with the experiment in Chapter 9 may have been
related to basic beliefs that invidious conduct deserves retributive punishment. These beliefs may
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It is noteworthy that other jury decision- making research indicates that when trial judges as
well as jurors are asked to apply probabilistic formulas in abstract settings they tend to perform
poorly. 180 On the other hand bodies of research indicate that when decisions are made in the
context of concrete examples and settings, lay persons can make relatively accurate probabilistic
judgments. 181 Given the complexity and artificiality of the research reported in Chapter 9 as well
as the fact that the stimulus materials do not correspond with actual conditions under which real
juries operate or with legal doctrine providing for retributive as well as deterrent purposes of
punishment the application of these findings to legal policy are difficult to discern.

Summarizing: Experimental Simulations and Experimental Validity in Perspective
The conclusion to Punitive Damages refers to the twenty empirical studies reported in the
volume and asserts that “[t]hese experimental tests were conducted on thousands of jury-eligible
citizens, on hundreds of mock juries, and on a few hundred experienced trial judges asked to
render punitive damages verdicts under legally realistic task conditions.”182 By focusing on the
actual methodological details of the experiments we can see that more than a few questions need to
be raised about the meaning of “legally realistic.” The gap between the experiments and the
conditions under which real world juries operate is wide and deep. Moreover, in some instances
the experiments presented such one-sided presentations of facts that serious questions can be raised
about the causal inferences the authors drew from their data.
The artificiality of experimental jury simulations has raised many questions about the
extent to which generalizations can be made to actual jury verdicts. 183 In a comprehensive review
of jury research methodology Robert MacCoun pointed out that while simulation experiments can
shed light on how variables probably influence verdicts, [w]hen the objective is to estimate
precisely the magnitude of trends and patterns in actual jury trials, …archival analysis [such as
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those “real world” studies discussed in the first section of this article] is more appropriate. The
role of mock- jury experimentation is to explain those patterns.”184
It is important to re-emphasize that my critique of Punitive Damages should not be taken as
a general indictment of experimental simulation research on juries. Beginning in the1970s
researchers began conducting experiments on juries. 185 Many of these experiments used trial
stimulus materials that were as spare in detail as the ones used in Punitive Damages. However, a
second generation of experiments quickly arose and became more sophisticated in taking
cognizance of legal policy matters and the richness of the jury’s factual environment, including
judicial constraints on juries. Researchers developed theories about jury behavior, tied those
theories to broader bodies of psychological research and checked their results against real world
studies. Ironically, a series of jury simulation studies by one of the authors of Punitive Damages
resulted in the “story model” of juror decision making processes 186 that supplanted earlier models
of jury decision making and is, unquestionably, not only the prevailing theory today, but one that
garners considerable support from real world data as well as from many other experiments, some
using minimalist trial materials and others using much more sophisticated jury simulations. Taken
together the incremental knowledge gained from the large body of simulation studies does provide
a basis for assisting legal policy makers. 187
One problem (though I hasten to add, not the only problem) with Punitive Damages is the
lack of follow-through experiments that assess plausible alternative hypotheses. 188 Consider the ad
damnum experiment reported in Chapter 4. Putting aside the biased facts favoring plaintiffs in the
stimulus materials, it would be reasonable to conduct a first experiment looking only at the effect
of the plaintiff’s ad damnum request because the researcher might want to simply isolate only the
effects of the plaintiff’s request. However, careful researchers would have followed up with
additional experiments seeking to find out about the potentially countervailing effects of
184

Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking By Civil
Juries. In Robert Litan, ed., VERDICT : A SSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (1993).
185
I See generally, Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups 7
PSYCHOLOGY , PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW 622 (2001), Edie Greene and Brian Bornstein, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS (2003); Neal Feigenson, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
A CCIDENTS (2000); Valerie Hans, BUSINESS ON TRIAL (2000).
186
Reid Hastie, Stephen Penrod and Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983); Pennington and Hastie: A Cognitive
Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 519 (1991).
187
See, e.g., Smith, How Jurors Make Decisions: the Value of Trial Innovations, in G.T. Munsterman et al, eds., Jury
Trial Innovations (1997); B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and
Democratic Juries, 68 Indiana Law Journal 1229 (1993);
188

41

testimony and defense rebuttal that occur in real trials. Contrast Punitive Damages’ one-shotdraw-policy-conclusions model of research with the series of experiments by Saks and his coauthors and by Greene and Bornstein, as I discuss in my critique of Chapter 4. 189 These other
researchers did look at the effects of defense counter proposals and the effects of defense experts
and arrived at considerably different conclusions from those in Punitive Damages.
Consistent with MacCoun’s view most researchers are careful in generalizing from
experimental simulations like those in Punitive Damages. Greene and Bornstein’s important book,
Determining Damages, reviewed simulation research on jury decision making on damages,
including one of the studies of the Exxon group. In a chapter devoted to reforming damage award
decision- making, they stated: “…because we simply do not yet know enough, we urge policy
makers and court reformers to tread lightly over this ground that seems ever-shifting and decidedly
unstable.”190
As if to put a punctuation point on the Greene and Bornstein’s conclusion Professor
Jennifer Robbennolt reviewed the overall corpus of experimental research on juries and punitive
damages in a recent article to reach the following conclusion:
The research examining the processes by which jurors determine punitive
damages suggests that jurors take into account important characteristics of
the cases in making their punitive awards…. [J]urors do not appear to
make decisions that clearly differ from the decisions that judges would
make, certainly not to the extent that most critics of the jury would
suggest.”191
V. Other Perspectives Bearing on Overreaching Policy Claims in Punitive Damages
I have already drawn attention to the fact that Professors Sharkey and Feigenson, after
reviewing Punitive Damages, separately concluded that its authors have gone beyond their data in
making policy recommendations about juries and punitive damages. Professor Feigenson, for
example, stated, “…at many points in [Punitive Damages’] presentation the data do not support
[the authors’] critical view of punitive damages as strongly as they would have readers believe.”192
In an extremely thorough review of one of the experiments that preceded the book
Professor Richard Lempert concluded:
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The authors …do not make an adequate social science case for change [the
authors’ recommendation that juries should not decide punitive damages],
and their recommendation that this should be done deserves no weight in
any policy arenas. 193
In the original article containing the experiment that forms the basis of Chapter 9 194
Professor Viscusi drew attention to “the fundamental irrationality that juries display with respect to
punitive damage awards” and suggested that proposals to have judges rather than juries award
punitive damages would remedy the problem. 195 Steven Garber assessed the experiment’s
conceptual adequacy and the methodological soundness of its simulations, concluding that “[t]he
supporting argument and evidence are far from compelling,” and that its author’s conclusion about
juries was “a key policy recommendation that lacks foundation”196 Responding to the same article
Robert MacCoun wrote, “Viscusi’s data on their own are clearly too modest to support his
sweeping call to either remove punitive damages judgments from the jury or eliminate punitive
damages altogether.”197
VI. Conclusion

Judges and other legal policy makers need to avoid “grasshopper” tendencies in responding
to the corpus of work reported in Punitive Damages. Various critics of the research have drawn
attention to its conceptual and methodological weaknesses and the inappropriateness of the broad
policy recommendations set forth by the authors of those experiments. This article has drawn
193
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attention to the failure of the authors of Punitive Damages to confront real world data that is
inconsistent with their claims. Then, by focusing on the concepts of internal, external and
ecological validity it has confronted the simulation experiments on their own terms.
Deconstruction of the methodologies of the experiments demonstrates that they have
serious and incontrovertible failings, including limitations of the experimental simulations in
comparison to real world juries and biases built into the research materials that did not give a fair
test of how jurors might respond to evidence. Considered in conjunction with critiques of Punitive
Damages or individual experiments in the corpus of Exxon–funded research that have been set
forth by other authors, it is abundantly clear that Punitive Damages should not be treated as
empirical authority for individual cases or for tort reform generally.
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